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Abstract-This article reviews some of the salient features of the Belgian health care finance and delivery 
system. Special attention is paid to the role played by the third-party payers, i.e. the Health Insurance 
Associations (HIAs) in administering the compulsory national health insurance program. It is shown how, 
despite extensive government regulation, the markets for GP, specialist and hospital services exhibit fierce 
competition of the non-price variety. 
Next, the paper considers the three problems perceived to be the most pressing ones at present: (i) the 
problem of raising sufficient revenues to cover the public share of health expenditures; (ii) the (related) 
cost containment problem; and (iii) the problem of ensuring efficiency through appropriate incentive 
mechanisms. 
Finally, two recently proposed options for reform are discussed and complemented with a third proposal 
based on the ideas of regulated competition. It is concluded that strengthening the role of the third-party 
payers remains crucial in any attempt to reshape the system to make it efficient and affordable while 
keeping it equitable. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, health care in the nineties does not 
seem to be a major social policy problem in Belgium. 
In comparison to .:s neighbour countries, Belgium 
Seems to be achieving a similar performance in terms 
of health outcomes while spending a slightly lower 
share of its GDP [l]. Most of the essential character- 
istics of the present day Belgian health care financing 
system were decided upon in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. This paper reviews some of these 
features and asks whether they are still appropriate in 
view of the recent financing problems. The next 
section gives a description of the main characteristics 
of Belgian health care financing and delivery and 
evaluates the respective roles of markets and regu- 
lation in achieving allocations of resources. Section 3 
gives an account of the economic problems perceived 
to be currently the most prominent. In section 4 some 
possible developments in the near future are con- 
sidered. After a discussion of two recently proposed 
opposite scenarios for reform, the potential for a 
more drastic reform is discussed which includes el- 
ements of what might be called a Belgian version of 
managed competition. 
2. HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE 
IN BELGIUM 
Belgium has a compulsory national health in- 
surance, covering major health risks of the entire 
population and major and minor risks for about 88% 
(in 1991) of the population. Compulsory health in- 
surance is combined with a private system of delivery 
of health care, based on independent medical prac- 
tice, free choice of doctor and-until recently-pre- 
dominantly fee-for-service payment. Although health 
insurance is compulsory, management and adminis- 
tration of insurance is predominantly left to non- 
governmental non-profit organizations (i.e. the 
mutual aid funds or ‘mutualiteiten’). The role of 
government is limited to regulation and partial fund- 
ing, leaving providers with a large degree of sover- 
eignty in both clinical and managerial matters. 
2.1. Health insurance associations (HIAs) 
The national health insurance programs are admin- 
istered by six Health Insurance Associations (HIAs) 
which are the main third-party purchasers of health 
care in Belgium. These national associations group a 
much larger number of local mutual aid funds. 
Although there are six associations, two dominate the 
scene i.e. the National Alliance of Christian Mutual 
Funds (covering about 45% of the population) and 
the National Union of Socialist Mutual Funds 
(covering about 29% of the population). The main 
features of these HIAs are their non-profit status, 
their ideological alignment and their decentralized 
administration. 
HIAs are basically non-profit, non-commercial 
organizations. By law they are entrusted with a 
primary role in health insurance and given a (joint) 
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monopoly position in the compulsory health in- 
surance market. Furthermore, mutualities are incor- 
porated organizations but exempted from taxes and 
other rules governing commercial ventures. Historical 
circumstances explain the present-day ideological 
alignment of HIAs. Early mutual aid societies gained 
financial stability, political protection and subsidies 
by associating with the labour movement. As labour 
unions were organized along different ideological 
positions-catholic, socialist and liberal-the mutual 
aid societies aligned accordingly. At present, this 
ideological alignment is still very important. Each of 
the major HIAs has its supporters in its respective 
political party and labour movement. Consequently, 
competition between HIAs often has political and 
ideological overtones. Early day local mutual aid 
societies searched greater financial stability by form- 
ing larger risk pools. Local mutual aid societies of the 
same ideological family grouped together and formed 
regional federations. Later, regional federations 
grouped together and formed national alliances. This 
tree-layer decentralized structure still exists today, 
although the influence of local alliances is rather 
limited. 
HIAs have essentially a captive and non-con- 
testable market in the health insurance business. They 
gained this position in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. Before World War II health insurance 
was not compulsory and HIAs collected fees from 
members. HIAs were however subsidized, encourag- 
ing growth in membership of HIAs so that almost 
three quarters of the population was protected to 
some extent . :I a local mutuality. After the World 
War II, the collection of health insurance contri- 
butions was centralized and embedded in a global 
system of social security. Most importantly, HIAs 
obtained exclusive access to a captive market when 
legislation was enacted that made membership of a 
mutuality compulsory for all wage earners or salaried 
persons and their dependents. Later, this captive 
market was extended further as enrolment in a mutu- 
ality was made compulsory for self-employed and 
their dependents (in 1963) and government employees 
(1965). Recent legislation on the legal status of HIAs 
(1990) confirmed their non-contestable position as 
administrators of national health insurance. 
2.2. National health insurance programs 
The national health insurance program consists of 
a so-called ‘general regime’, covering major as well as 
minor health risks for 8.6 million private and public 
sector wage-earners and salaried personnel and their 
dependents, and a ‘regime for the self-employed’, 
covering only major health risks for 1.2 million 
self-employed and their dependents. Each program 
covers the reimbursement of medical care costs, but 
also covers income compensation. 
Contributions for all social security programs are 
collected by a government agency. They consist of a 
flat tax on labour earnings paid by employers, em- 
ployed and self-employed. This is supplemented by a 
government subsidy replacing the contributions of 
the beneficiaries of certain social security programs 
(unemployed, aged, poor, . . .). Eannarked contri- 
butions for health insurance are transferred to the 
Institute for Sickness and Invalidity Insurance (IN- 
AMI/RIZIV). This is the specific government agency 
responsible for health and disability insurance which 
distributes the funds over the six HIAs, supervises 
HIAs, negotiates fee schedules with physicians and 
other practitioners and coordinates policy in general. 
Funds are distributed over the HIAs according to 
their membership contributions. Government subsi- 
dies are distributed using a specific formula, taking 
into account the composition of beneficiaries of each 
HIA of other social security programs. 
It can be seen from Table 1 [2] that as a result of 
this financing mechanism the largest HIA (the Chris- 
tian) received a larger share of the total membership 
contributions (i.e. 48.3%) than its share of total 
membership (i.e. 44.7%) but a smaller share of total 
government subsidies (i.e. 36.6%). The opposite is 
true for the second largest HIA (the Socialist) whose 
contributions share was lower and whose subsidy 
share was larger than its membership share. For most 
other HIAs, the respective shares of contributions 
and subsidies are more in line with their membership 
shares. 
Any remaining discrepancies between total expen- 
ditures and total revenues of an HIA are covered 
through a system of preliminary financing. Defacto, 
HIAs with a surplus end up prefinancing HIAs with 
a deficit, so that eventually expenditures and revenues 
are equalized for each HIA. Until 1980 HIAs received 
6.5% of total turnover as administration costs. These 
costs are now budgeted and only adjusted for con- 
sumer price inflation. 
Medical care benefits are limited to major risks for 
the self-employed, whereas for wage and salary 
earners coverage is very broad. All physicians-GPs, 
Table I. Percentage distributions of membership. sources of rwenuc and expenditures by HIA in 1990 
HIA Membership Contributions Government subsidy Total revenue Expenditures 
Christian 44.73 48.26 36.62 42.68 41.65 
Socialist 28.89 25.29 35.02 29.63 31.61 
Occupation 14.99 15.43 15.20 15.33 14.88 
Liberal 6.36 6.27 7.45 6.80 6.67 
Neutral 4.25 4.15 4.85 4.64 4.45 
Auxiliary 0.78 0.60 0.86 0.92 0.73 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ref. [2]. 
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dentists and specialists-charge fee-for-service and 
patients have to seek reimbursement from their mutu- 
ality. A fee schedule--the so-called ‘nomenclature’- 
is established nationally by the INAMI/RIZIV after 
negotiations between the doctors’ syndicates and the 
HIAs. As a rule, reimbursement is between 60 and 
75% of the negotiated fee. For the poor, the elderly 
and certain other groups, reimbursement is more 
generous and up to 90 to 100%. 
Hospitalization is covered extensively by national 
health insurance programs. There is no distinction in 
coverage between private and public hospitals. Costs 
of hospital stay and nursing care (hotel costs) are 
strictly separated from costs of medical services (in- 
cluding laboratory and radiology services). Hospital 
services are paid for under the negotiated fee schedule 
for physician services. Patients only pay the coin- 
surance premiums, as all medical bills are centralized 
and directly sent to the regional federations of mutu- 
alities. 
Hospital stay and nursing care is directly funded 
and regulated by the government through the 
Ministry of Public Health. Hospitals are budgeted on 
a cost-per-day basis. Annually a standard cost per 
day for each hospital, including patient care, nursing, 
maintenance, depreciation and financial cost, is esti- 
mated by the Department of Public Health. This 
standard cost is based on a mixture of parameters 
such as historical cost, average cost of a sample of 
hospitals with similar characteristics, case mix and 
work load. This standard cost is also the price per 
patient day for treatment in a general ward. Patients 
pay a flat price lx - day as a coinsurance contribution 
and hospitals are reimbursed 75% of the standard 
price by the HIAs and the remaining 25% consists of 
a subsidy by the Department of Public Health. 
The Department of Public Health also sets a target 
number of patient days, for which the per diem 
standard cost applies. If more patient days are pro- 
duced than the target number, then only 30% of the 
per diem is received for surplus production. When 
fewer patient days are logged than the target number, 
then for the shortfall only 50% of the per diem is 
received. These regulations-i.e. determining a stan- 
dard cost, based on a comparison with structurally 
similar hospitals and fixing a quotum for the number 
of patient days-date from 1982. During the eighties 
and especially in 1990-1991, the system was further 
refined and transformed into a form of prospective 
budgeting. 
2.3. Health care delivery 
In Belgium health care delivery is mainly private 
and based on independent medical practice or 
‘medecine lib&ale’ [3]. Ambulatory care is dominated 
by single-handed practices of self-employed phys- 
icians, dentists and pharmacists. The country has one 
of the highest physician per population ratios of the 
industrialized world viz. 31.7 doctors per 10000 popu- 
lation in 1990 141. Specialists have more control of 
access to their profession than general practitioners 
as their number is determined by the availability of 
training posts in teaching hospitals. In the market for 
GPs, there are clear signs of excess upply. Newcom- 
ers earn incomes so low that the rate-on-return on 
their education is very low. Even negative rates-on- 
return have been calculated for GPs when compared 
to a banking career in the early eighties in Belgium 
[5]. Newcomers are no longer capable to sustain a 
solo practice, and look for salaried employment in the 
private sector or take up another profession. For 
specialists there are no real shortages and even sur- 
pluses exist in some areas. Specialists usually also 
have hospital privileges. 
An important feature of the delivery system is that 
patients have a free choice of doctor. This is a 
powerful competitive stimulus, as some patients 
switch doctors and shop around, even for the same 
medical problem. Excess supply, especially in the 
market for GP services, and free choice of doctor, 
lead to fierce non-price competition among phys- 
icians (mostly through product differentiation). Price 
cutting and some forms of non-price competition 
such as advertizing are considered ‘unethical’ be- 
haviour and are subject to severe penalties adminis- 
tered by the Order of Physicians. Most specialists 
have an office practice and often work in hospital 
out-patient departments. Patients do not need a 
referral from a GP to consult a specialist. 
Competition between hospitals for patients, 
specialists and rights to facilities is fierce, especially 
since the country is fairly densely covered with hospi- 
tals. In 1981 the number of hospital beds per 1000 
population was 9.4. This has decreased to 7.9 hospital 
beds per 1000 population in 1990, mainly as a result 
of the conversion of hospital into nursing home beds 
141. 
About 60% of all hospitals are non-profit private 
institutions. A small number of private hospitals is 
owned by specialists and some 5% belong to HIAs. 
The remainder are public hospitals. Apart from a 
more generous regime of capital funding, there is no 
difference in the method of financing private and 
public hospitals. Hospitals draw on two major 
sources to finance their activities. First, on the 
prospective budget, based on the standard per diem 
and the quotum of patient days. Three payers con- 
tribute to the total per diem price: patients pay a fixed 
copayment per day, HIAs pay 75% of the per diem 
and the Department of Public Health pays 25% of 
the per diem. A second possible source of revenue for 
hospitals are fee-splitting arrangements with staff 
physicians. 
2.4. Competition, markets and regulation 
Health insurance and health care in Belgium is, as 
elsewhere, subject to extensive regulation. A distinct 
feature of the Belgian system is, however, that it 
combines compulsory, comprehensive and universal 
national health insurance with a reliance on patient 
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choice, non-government agencies, private (non- 
profit) institutions and entrepreneurial medical pro- 
fessionals in delivering health insurance and medical 
care. In almost every submarket of the insurance and 
health system, barriers to entry are stiff or prohibitive 
for newcomers, but within each market there is often 
a substantial degree of competition, mostly of the 
non-price variety. 
The market for compulsory health insurance is a 
closed market and non-contestable, leaving no room 
for new entrants. Existing HIAs as a group have a 
‘monopoly’ position, as they have exclusive rights to 
funding out of collectively raised social security con- 
tributions and government subsidies. As legislation 
on the recognition of HIAs provides explicitly for the 
non-profit status of these organizations granting 
them tax-exemption and other privileges, private 
for-profit insurance companies are excluded from the 
compulsory health insurance market. This is in con- 
trast with other compulsory insurance schemes in 
Belgium, such as for occupational hazards [6], where 
the government relies entirely on for-profit firms for 
delivery and administration. Even the residual mar- 
ket for complementary health insurance-i.e. the 
health risks not covered by the compulsory scheme- 
cannot effectively be contested by private for-profit 
firms. HIAs, by their non-profit tax-exempted pos- 
ition, can provide additional coverage for members at 
‘non-commercial’ rates i.e. rates that would allow for 
taxes and profits. In addition to this privileged tax 
position, economies of scale and scope give existing 
HIAs a ‘first-mover advantage’, which is difficult to 
offset even h - the most efficient and large scale 
private operator. 
Within this captive market of compulsory and 
complementary health insurance, non-price compe- 
tition for members between HIAs is fierce. All major 
HIAs have offices in each municipality or town and 
members have the option of changing to another 
mutuality every three months. Although most mem- 
bers are very ‘brand-loyal’, there is shifting at the 
margin and competition for new members. Some of 
the incentives for competition among HIAs are finan- 
cially driven, but the strive for ideological dominance, 
political power and influence, and sheer engagement 
should not be underrated. The main instruments of 
competition are the ‘quality’ of service and product 
differentiation. Most HIAs offer not only additional 
insurance but other health and welfare related ser- 
vices such as homecare and homemaking, savings 
accounts for youngsters, holidays for youngsters, etc. 
Entry to health care provision markets is somewhat 
less restrictive and internally highly competitive. En- 
try to the market for GP services is fairly open. 
Physicians as a profession over the years lost control 
over the supply of new GPs as they were unable to 
restrict the entry of students to medical schools. 
Student numbers increased rapidly as a consequence 
both of the drastic extension of health insurance in 
the sixties, leading to soaring physician incomes, and 
the almost simultaneous reduction in the real cost of 
education, through regional decentralization of medi- 
cal schools [A. Consequently, there is now a glut of 
GPs (14.6 per 10000 population or only about 700 
patients per GP in 1990), creating room for fierce 
competition, mostly of a non-price variety. For in- 
stance, in comparison to other countries, Belgian GPs 
have a much larger share of their services delivered at 
the home of the patient. Regional data show that 
home calls as a share of total patient contacts clearly 
correlate with physician density, as more rivals force 
GPs to substitute patients’ time for their own time, 
thereby lowering patient costs of utilization. 
Specialists were more successful in retaining con- 
trol over access to their profession. Specialist rainees 
work under supervision of a specialist who pays his 
trainees out of fees from services delivered to patients. 
Consequently, new entries depend upon the number 
of clinical training posts in teaching hospitals, the 
volume of which is largely controlled by established 
specialists. Although access to the specialist pro- 
fession is more restricted, due to the decreasing 
number of hospital beds in the 80s there are no real 
shortages of specialists and even surpluses exist in 
some specialties. 
Competition among physicians is mostly of the 
non-price variety due to the fact that prices are, to a 
certain extent, rigid and formed at the national level. 
General practitioners, specialists and dentists charge 
fee for service. Prices though are not freely formed in 
a competitive market but are the negotiated outcome 
in a market resembling bilateral monopoly. A very 
detailed and sophisticated fee schedule, the so called 
‘nomenclatuur’, is established nationally by the gov- 
ernment agency (INAMI/RIZIV) after negotiations 
between the physicians’ syndicates and the HIAs. 
Reimbursement is on average 60-75% of the listed 
fee and 90-100% for the poor and the elderly. Each 
year, a general increase and/or adjustments of fees are 
negotiated between the HIAs and representatives of 
physician organizations within government-set bud- 
getary limits. In case of non-agreement, the govern- 
ment is the decision maker of last resort. Physician 
members are consulted on the outcome of these 
negotiations and if a qualified majority of all phys- 
icians agrees to the new fee schedule, it becomes 
legally binding for all who have not explicitly ob- 
jected. In December 1992, for the first time in many 
years, negotiations lead to a stalemate. The govern- 
ment decided unilaterally on an across-the-board 
increase in fees, lower than physician representatives 
proposed, and put its proposal to the vote. The 
majority of physicians rejected the proposed fee 
increase, so that, in 1993 individual physicians could 
in principle determine prices freely. However, despite 
this dispute no important fee changes above the 
governments’ proposal, have been reported, indicat- 
ing a general reluctance on the part of physicians to 
compete with prices, which is no surprise in view of 
the abundant supply of physicians. 
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This ‘nomenclatuur’ plays an important role in the 
market for physicians’ services. In the GP market, as 
patients have free choice of doctor and do shop 
around and as a consequence of the ample supply of 
GPs, competitive market pricing would most cer- 
tainly mean lower prices. However, the fee schedule 
sets an effective price floor for GP services or is, at 
least, a major ‘focal point’ for pricing GP services. 
The Order of Physicians, with judicial power similar 
to a court of law, considers pricing below the negoti- 
ated ‘unethical practice’ and even temporarily sus- 
pends unabiding physicians from medical practice. 
This effective threat limits downward price compe- 
tition as potential gains in market share and income 
from charging lower income do not outweight poten- 
tial losses from being barred from practice. 
The ‘nomenclatuur’ also comprises specialist ser- 
vices. Similar to the market for GP services, for those 
specialties known to be in excess upply (paediatrics, 
obstetrics, . . .) the schedule acts as an effective price 
floor. For specialties in excess demand and for the 
services of renowned specialists, demand is simply 
rationed by price as there is no legal or ‘ethical’ 
impediment o charging fees above the negotiated fee 
[8]. Extra billing-i.e. charging fees above the stan- 
dard tariff in the ‘nomenclatuur’-is not uncommon 
for specialist hospital services. Furthermore, income 
dependent price discrimination is often practiced and 
extra billing is not always tax reported. 
Again, entry in the market for hospital services as 
a whole is restricted by regulation. One of the con- 
ditions for subsidization by the Department of Public 
Health is that a %spital must obtain a license to 
operate a certain number of beds in each broad 
category (acute care, surgery, maternity, etc.). Simi- 
larly, operating heavy technology (e.g. NMR) is also 
subject to licensing as a condition for reimbursement 
or subsidization. Consequently, the government has 
an instrument to control global hospital capacity. It 
has used these powers effectively to reduce the num- 
ber of beds over the years and to transform the 
number of (expensive) hospital care beds to (less 
expensive) nursing home beds. 
The independent character of the medical pro- 
fession in Belgium is characterized by the contractual 
arrangements in private hospitals between the hospi- 
tal and its physicians staff. Most specialists are 
self-employed, earning their income on a fee-for- 
service basis. In most private hospitals, but also in 
public hospitals, physicians generally obtain the priv- 
ilege of access to hospital facilities only in return for 
an agreement o share fees with the hospital. The 
precise fee-splitting is subject to negotiation and 
depends upon relative scarcity or abundance in a 
speciality, the extent of hospital facilities, hospital 
reputation, reputation of the specialist, etcetera. In 
public hospitals, as well as in some private hospitals, 
physicians often pool their fees. They are then paid 
a basic salary, augmented with some pre-negotiated 
share of the pool. These fee-splitting arrangements 
are part of the competitive instruments which hospi- 
tals use in attracting specialists and their patient 
clientele. On the other hand, revenues from fee-split- 
ting are an increasingly important share of hospital 
income. 
A specific example of the competitive and en- 
trepreneurial nature of Belgian health care delivery, 
which also clearly illustrates what can go wrong in 
poorly regulated markets in medical care services, is 
that of laboratory testing (clinical biology). Up to 
1985, all laboratory testing was on a fee for service 
basis, with no limits or control on the prescription of 
tests other than self-regulation by the Order of Phys- 
icians. Technological advances not only lead to new 
diagnostic tests but also enabled low cost testing 
through automation, making testing a highly 
profitable business. The absence of any copayments 
by patients and the ‘advertising-through-training’ 
directed at physicians lead to fairly ‘frivolous’ use of 
tests by GPs as well as specialists. Fee-splitting 
between laboratories and prescribing physicians or 
other (illegal) kickbacks rewarding high prescribers 
were fairly common practice. Also, hospitals used 
their laboratories (and radiology) to generate ad- 
ditional revenues from diagnostic services to inpa- 
tients and outpatients. In many cases, this was a 
defensive response to compensate for reductions in 
their other main source of income i.e. the per diem 
cost reimbursement. Various attempts to control 
costs of diagnostic testing were implemented. A 
nationwide data management system was imposed so 
that high prescribers could be identified and, eventu- 
ally, called to explain their prescribing behaviour. 
Since 1985, the Department of Public Health imposed 
a national budget on the fee for service. system, with 
the threat of reducing fees if the budget was exceeded. 
Prescribers-each fearing free riding by others at 
their expense-responded by an explosion in quan- 
tity, forcing the Department to reduce the fees by 
30% in 1988. Since 1989, the fixed budget is almost 
strictly enforced by abolishing the fee for service 
system for hospital patients and replacing it by a daily 
rate and a fee per admission. Since October 1992, a 
new system for out-patient tests was introduced. 
Basically, fees were reduced drastically, globalized 
and made degressive. Also individual prescription 
behaviour is closely monitored and heavy prescribers 
are asked for an explanation. 
The overall consequence of the fact that Belgian 
health policy has until recently relied almost exclu- 
sively on public control of fees but at the same time 
maintained fee for service payment of essentially 
private providers, Seems to be that Belgium has a ‘low 
prices-high volumes’ health system. 
3. CURRENT PROBLEMS 
Before venturing into problems and reform pro- 
posals it is important to remind that the Belgian 
health care system has many strengths. Contrary to 
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many other countries, equity and access to care does has important consequences for the political econ- 
not seem to be a major issue and expenditures per omy of the sector. In case of funding out of general 
capita and growth are not excessive compared with taxes, the beneficiaries and providers of a service, for 
neighbour countries. whom the stakes are often substantial and clearly 
According to a recent OECD Health Policy Study visible, often successfully lobby for more expendi- 
comparing health systems and reform in seven OECD tures. For the individual tax payer, it is often not 
countries: worthwhile to put up a countervailing lobby against 
The Belgian health care system demonstrates many those special interests as resulting tax increases are 
strengths. It offers comprehensive compulsory health in- too small to justify expenses to put up a defense. 
surance cover to 85% of the populations and compulsory 
cover for major risks to the remaining 15% of the popu- 
The partial funding of the health insurance pro- 
lation. This ensures a high level of solidarity and equity in 
gram by a flat iabour tax changes this standard public 
access. Patients enjoy greater freedom of choice of provider choice mechanism. Increased spending, insofar as it is 
than in any of the other six countries in this study. Con- not met by an increase in government subsidies, 
sumers are free to choose both their insurer and their necessitates higher labour taxes. These tax increases 
provider [. . .] The system also gives providers a great deal 
of autonomy [. . .] the system seems to be remarkably 
have clear and localized effects. Rising labour costs 
responsive to patients. Access to GP services seems to be 
drive out marginal businesses or induce job losses. 
particularly quick and convenient, and it is said that there The impact of higher social security spending directly 
are few people waiting for hospital in-patient care. [3, p. 371. affects labour market conditions by inducing either 
One should take these important and enviable 
lower net wages or increases in unemployment due to 
strengths in mind, when discussing the system’s prob- 
higher labour costs. The dominant HIAs (Christian, 
lems and especially when making proposals for re- 
Socialist and Liberal) are closely linked to the ideo- 
form. 
logically aligned trade unions, and are considered 
part of the same ‘social movement’. As decreasing net 
3.1. Financing health care 
wages or rising unemployment is not in the trade 
unions’ interest, HIAs may come under pressure from 
Financing health insurance and medical care costs their associated unions to control excessive growth of 
is one of the recurrent policy discussions. Compared medical costs and insurance expenditures. In this 
with other countries, health care costs in Belgium mixed funding system, HIAs, trade unions and em- 
cannot be considered excessive. According to the ployers’ organizations are forced to share part of the 
OECD statistics, Belgium spent only 7.9% of its responsibility with the government to keep health 
GNP on health care in 1991, which is below the care costs in check. In this way, the reliance on 
average of neighbouring European countries [9]. payroll taxes to finance a large part of the health 
However, it h*s recently been argued that the OECD insurance bill and its repercussions on the labour 
figures underesumate the true expenditures on health. market may provide a stimulus to HIAs (as part of 
By incorporating also a number of expenditive cat- the same ‘social movement’ as trade unions) to act as 
egories (e.g. by regional authorities) on health care, a countervailing power vis-ri-vis health care 
Wouters et al. [lo] have estimated that in 1987 providers. 
already 7.990 of GDP was spent on health care. This Recently, the government called upon unions and 
estimate was recently updated to 9.8% of GDP in employees to make a ‘new social deal’. Apart from 
1990 [ll]. structural measures to curb the dynamics of social 
The relative shares of the various sources of finance security spending, it was suggested that the strong 
for health care have only been calculated for 1987 and reliance on wage taxes should be reduced and that 
1990. In 1987 36% was financed from social security alternative methods, such as value added taxes, taxes 
contributions, 39% from general taxation, 12% from on energy or general taxes, should be used to contrib- 
out-of-pocket payments, 3% from voluntary in- ute to funding social security. Relying more on 
surance. and the remaining 10% represents a social non-labour taxes would alter the present public 
security deficit [12]. Assuming that the deficit will also choice mechanism. It might provide less of an incen- 
be covered by an increase in either the tax or the tive for social organizations (HIAs and trade unions) 
social security share, it implies that about 85% was to countervail the power of providers of social secu- 
financed from public revenues. In 1990, 32% was rity programs and pressures from beneficiaries of 
financed from taxes, 54.5% from social and voluntary social security. More of this countervailing effort 
insurance premiums, and 13.5% from direct pay- would be required from the government. Unfortu- 
ments of health care users. This means that, between nately, the Belgian political class is certainly not 
1987 and 1990, the share financed from public sources renowned for fiscal orthodoxy and restrain. Hence, it 
has decreased slightly, mainly as a result of the is possible that a shift in financing social security will 
decrease in the tax-financed share of expenditures. lead to expenditure increases, more direct govern- 
Social security contributions are a flat-tax on ment control and eventually more fiscal problems. 
wages, shared by employers and employees (currently Although financing health insurance is a recurrent 
at 6.35% of gross wages with no upper limit). Fund- policy issue, and a pressing one in view of the present 
ing almost half of health insurance by a labour tax depressed economic climate, one should not drama- 
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Table 2. Annual growth rates of health care revenues and 
exoenditures. 1971-1989 
1971-1989 1979-1989 
ReDUUltV 
Government 
Non-government 
Total 
Average SD Average SD 
12.13 9.76 6.58 6.20 
11.29 6.05 7.14 2.64 
II.59 7.19 7.17 3.01 
Expenditures II.31 6.85 6.53 2.72 
GNP (real) 2.52 2.12 I .96 I .6l 
Deflator (GNP) 6.06 2.82 4.53 1.58 
Source: Ref. [27] 
tize this problem. Growth in Belgian health expendi- 
tures has, by international standards, not been exces- 
sive over the last twenty years and real growth is 
reasonably well under control (see Table 2). As 
revenues from payroll contributions are cyclical and 
closely linked to the level of economic activity, this 
variability often leads to short-term problems of 
financing health expenditures. However, despite its 
dependence on economic activity, growth in revenues 
from contributions is relatively more stable than 
revenues from government sources. 
In Table 2 it is shown that the standard deviation 
of the average annual growth rate is much higher for 
the revenues from government sources (i.e. from 
general taxes) than from non-government sources. In 
the period 1979-89, nominal growth rates have gone 
down and become more stable, and this was es- 
pecially the case for the non-government revenues. It 
therefore seems that at least part of the recurrent 
financial strain on the system is in the whimsical 
nature of govemt, -nts, rather than in the business 
cycle. Consequently, more reliance on funding out of 
general taxation rather than on payroll contributions 
is likely to make revenues less stable as they will be 
more dependent upon the good fortune of political 
coalitions and the changing mood of the bodies 
governing the country. 
3.2. Controlling costs 
The health care cost containment debate is closely 
related to the financing problems. In 1989 a ‘Round 
Table Conference’, organized by the Department of 
Social Affairs, concluded that mixed contributory 
and tax financing has to be maintained as the basis 
for funding, but also that social security contri- 
butions (now up to 40% of total wage costs) should 
not increase and that the share of health insurance in 
social security could not rise at the expense of other 
benefits. Furthermore it was concluded that the bulk 
of health expenditure should be covered by general 
taxation. However, in view of the country’s structural 
fiscal mess, with a public debt far exceeding GNP, it 
is unlikely that funding out of general taxes can be 
increased substantially. 
Another option is to increase cost-sharing by 
patients. The present government recently decided to 
increase cost-sharing, thereby shifting health care 
costs of about 7.5 billion BF (some 2% of total 
reimbursements) to the patients. It is realised, how- 
ever, that its revenue generating capacity is fairly 
limited and policy makers are fearful of the equity 
problems arising from an extensive use of cost-shift- 
ing to patients and consumers. Income-related maxi- 
mum annual copayment amounts were introduced to 
mitigate the adverse effects of this increased cost- 
sharing for low-income families. 
As the immediate prospects for increases in rev- 
enues are dim, control of expenditure has been the 
main goal of regulatory efforts. Recent governments 
have opted for more direct government regulation, 
rather than providing regulatory incentives and in- 
struments for self-regulation. In 1990, legislation was 
adopted allowing the government (the Department of 
Social Affairs) to fix a global budget for health care 
expenditure and a division of it over several subsec- 
tars. To ensure that budgetary targets are met, a 
budget control commission is set up, obligatory cor- 
rection mechanisms-such as automatic downward 
fee adjustment if budgets are overrun, obligatory 
refunding by high-cost providers, etc.-are provided 
for, as well as extensive powers for the Minister of 
Social Affairs to intervene directly when HIAs and 
providers do not meet budgetary targets. The evi- 
dence on the success of this approach is rather mixed 
as can be seen from Table 3. 
As in most other countries, both nominal and real 
,expenditure growth was lower in the seventies than in 
the eighties. Tighter budgetary control mechanisms 
were implemented in 1991. The substantial increases 
in real growth in 1990/1992 is attributable to excep- 
tionally high increases in wages and salaries of health 
workers, rather than to increased volumes in health 
services. A substantial part of the high ‘real’ growth 
rates between 1989 and 1991 is therefore xplained by 
the fact that the nominal growth was deflated using 
the general consumer price index rather than a health 
care specific price deflator. The negative real growth 
in the first semester of 1992/1993 could be a first 
consequence of the closer budget monitoring system. 
3.3. Eficiency 
According to the OECD survey study, the Belgian 
health care system has some desirable features with 
respect o ensuring efficiency viz.: 
[. . .] it seems likely that Belgium can continue to rely on its 
Table 3. Growth in health care expenditures in Belgium, 1969-1993 
Nominal Consumer price Real 
Period growth index growth 
1969-1974 15.44 6.41 9.03 
19741979 13.54 7.28 6.26 
1979-1984 8.28 7.14 1.14 
1984-1989 6.49 2.36 4.13 
1989-1990 8.76 3.45 5.31 
199&1991 11.95 3.25 8.70 
1991-1992 10.30 2.43 7.87 
1992-1993 (1st sem) 2.17 2.50 -0.34 
Source: Ref. 191. 
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strong traditions of consumer choice and autonomy of 
provider to ensure competition among providers, a high 
level of responsiveness to demands and a high level of 
patient satisfaction. [3, p. 421. 
However, although consumer change and compet- 
ing providers might be sufficient for ordinary com- 
modities to ensure efficiency, it is not the case in the 
health care market. Consumers are quite often not in 
a position to judge the quality of care and, as a result 
of extensive coverage by insurance, not cost-con- 
scious. ‘Professional ethics’ restrict competition 
among providers to limited forms of competition. In 
such an environment of restricted competition and 
consumer ignorance about product or service quality, 
without proper controls and checks on producer 
behaviour, there is plenty of scope for abuse and 
excesses and consequently inefficiency. The standard 
forms of checks and controls such as licensing, ethical 
standards, self-regulatory measures by the medical 
profession, seem insufficient o countervail the power- 
ful economic incentive generated by a fee for service 
system. 
There is evidence of some gross inefficiencies in 
parts of the Belgian health care system. Some ineffi- 
ciencies are the result of an absence of quality checks, 
standards and monitoring of provider behaviour, in 
those sectors where consumer ignorance is highest. 
Other inefficiencies are due to the practice of setting 
national fees (the ‘nomenclature*). Overpricing of 
medical services-eg. prices far in excess of costs 
including normal profits, or prices lagging behind 
huge productivity gains through learning leading to 
excessive rents-stimulate their practice or prescrip- 
tion far beyoni diagnostic or therapeutic relevance. 
Laboratory testing (and radiology) provides a clear 
example of these excesses. Inpatient laboratory test- 
ing was financed fee for service up to 1988. Pro- 
ductivity gains in laboratory testing, reflected in 
lower fees only with a lag and leaving substantial 
rents per service, and the absence of quality standards 
and monitoring, lead to excessive prescription by 
GPs, specialists and hospitals. Hospitals, having fee- 
splitting arrangements with their specialists, used 
their laboratories as means to generate additional 
revenue, stimulating the volume of laboratory testing. 
In 1985 HIAs, medical doctors and the government 
decided on a national budget. If the budget were 
exceeded, fees were to be cut proportionally. As there 
were no volume checks on provider behaviour, the fee 
cut was met by an almost proportional increase in 
volume. This provides a clear example of inefficiency 
i.e. a volume of services that is largely unrelated to 
diagnostic value but in sheer response to financial 
considerations. From 1988 onwards, a new financing 
mechanism was gradually implemented, based on a 
payment per day and an additional payment per 
admission for in-patients. Large and specialized lab- 
oratories are active in this field. Fee-splitting and 
kickbacks-although illegal-to prescribing GPs and 
specialists are not uncommon. A ‘diluted’ fee for 
service system is maintained for out-patients because 
a degressive fee schedule and peer review discourages 
overprescribing. These new methods of direct govem- 
ment control by fixed budgets and sanctions if bud- 
gets are exceeded have brought expenditures as well 
as the level of volume under control. It limits gross 
inefficiencies by overprescribing. It does, however, 
little to remedy inefficiencies at the micro-level. The 
crude methods of fixing budgets at the micro level- 
usually freezing budgets at historic levels-rewards 
previously inefficient behaviour. 
Large regional variations in medical consumption, 
not accounted for by differences in patient compo- 
sition but attributed to differences in ‘style of prac- 
tice’, are another indication for the existence of 
inefficiencies. A complicating factor is that-to a 
large extent-these differences are largest between the 
north and the south of the country. In the Belgian 
political context, with recurrent tensions between 
Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia, regional statistics 
have a special meaning. Although several consti- 
tutional reforms since 1980 have shifted important 
functions (economic policy, education, culture, en- 
vironment, public health, . . .) to the three regions 
(Flanders, Brussels, Wallonia) or communities (Flem- 
ish, French), social security is still a federal program 
with uniform rules and regulations across the 
country. Those politically thriving on emphasizing 
the heterogeneity of the country and nationalistic 
feelings, are constantly on the look-out for differences 
in costs and benefits, generated under national rules, 
between Dutch-speaking Flanders, French-speaking 
Wallonia and the bilingual region of the capital 
Brussels. The general debate is about the financial 
transfers within the social security system. It was 
estimated that the transfer of Flanders and Brussels 
to Wallonia annually amounted to approx. 100 bil- 
lion BF but is likely to decrease in the future [ 121. The 
transfer is mainly caused by differences in revenues 
generated, rather than differences in expenditures. 
Considering only health insurance, the net transfer 
from Flanders and Brussels to Wallonia in 1989 was 
estimated at approx. 25 billion BF [13]. Again 
85-90% of this transfer is due to differences in the 
revenue generating capacity of the regions, rather 
than differences in medical consumption. For some 
politicians such transfers are excessive and they argue 
for the devolution of social security programs to the 
regions. As social security is one of the last major 
federal programs, some argue that its devolution 
would put the existence of Belgium as a country in 
jeopardy. 
On the side of this major and recurrent political 
discussion, data on regional differences in medical 
consumption and expenditures per capita were pro- 
duced, showing large variations between areas and 
regions. According to one study [14] some 40% of 
these variations in medical consumption can be ex- 
plained by patient characteristics such as age, income, 
labour market status, education, environmental fac- 
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tom and by supply characteristics. The remainder of 
the variation is attributed to specific regional influ- 
ences and or differences between HIA enrollment. 
The precise mechanisms generating the differentials 
are unknown but regional differences in ‘style of 
medical practice’ and differences between HIAs in 
using the rulebook on cost reimbursements are 
suggested as possible explanations. But it also 
suggests inefficiency in medical practice induced by 
inappropriate incentives. 
4. OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
Two opposite scenarios for reform of the Belgian 
health care system have recently been proposed. 
These will be briefly described and compared to a 
third alternative based on the ideas of managed 
competition. 
4.1. Direct governmental budgetary control 
Beeckmans [151 defends the new cost containment 
strategy that was introduced on January 1st 1991, 
which is essentially a system of tight budget control. 
The key elements of this reform are as follows. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The government annually decides ex ante on 
the global budget to be allocated to the 
health insurance sector as a whole, and to 
some of its subsectors. In cases of overspend- 
ing, the Minister is required to take remedial 
action to either compensate for the amount 
of overspending (in the case of hospitals and 
laboratories) or to prevent future overspend- 
ing (all othLI cases). 
Per subsector, providers and HIAs collec- 
tively have to negotiate how to allocate the 
global budget, e.g. by means of fee agree- 
ments. If these parties fail to negotiate an 
agreement, he government (by means of the 
Management Committee of the RIZIV), in 
its role of decision maker of last resort, is 
bound to take action to meet the budgetary 
targets. 
A Special Committee for Budgetary Control 
reviews the expenditure patterns on a quar- 
terly basis. This signalling function aims at a 
better and, above all, quicker response to 
any signs of overspending. 
It is clear that under this option the role of the third 
party payers remains limited to negotiator on behalf 
of all the insured collectively and to the administra- 
tive tasks of reimbursement and control of pro- 
visions. It is too early to judge the effectiveness of this 
new budgetary mechanism of cost containment. A 
major problem remains the arbitrary allocation of 
budgets over the various types of health care. It is 
hard to see how improvements in allocative efficiency, 
for instance by means of substitution of outpatient 
for inpatient care through technological advances, 
will be implemented in such a rigid budgetary system. 
Another weakness of this approach seems to be the 
uncertainty regarding the outcomes of conflicts when 
providers and insurers are unable to negotiate an 
agreement over prices. 
4.2. Three-stage financial responsibility of insurers 
By law of 1963, HIAs have a closed budget consist- 
ing of their revenues-which is the sum of income-re- 
lated and supplementary premium payments of their 
members-with which they have to cover their ex- 
penses. The latter is mainly the reimbursement of 
(part of) the expenditures for care received by the 
members and operating costs. The legal financing rule 
of income-related supplementary premiums is rather 
inequitable. An HIA insuring high income earners 
would enjoy higher revenues and lower expenditures 
as high income earners are generally healthier. 
Despite the obvious incentives for selection of 
low-risk and high-income insured, active ‘cream 
skimming’ has not occurred. This was mainly a 
consequence of the fact that the legal obligation for 
HIAs to cover any deficits from additional sup- 
plementary premiums has never been enforced. Ac- 
tual allocations to the HIAs from the Central Fund 
have in the past usually been made according to 
reimbursement claims rather than the legally pre- 
scribed revenues. Rather than following the lawful 
(but inequitable) mechanism, actual practice in effect 
merely implied claims reimbursement and subsidies 
from ‘surplus’ HIAs to ‘deficit’ HIAs. Clearly, as the 
method of cost reimbursement does not stimulate 
cost-consciousness, it is therefore not surprising that 
gradually global deficits have become much larger 
than surpluses. By ad hoc government decisions, these 
deficits were generally covered by government subsi- 
dies. 
Kesenne [2] has proposed to put greater emphasis 
on the financial accountability mentioned in the 1963 
law. However, he does not propose to merely enforce 
the law, adapt the capitation formula and hold the 
individual HIAs financially responsible for their 
operations. Instead, he proposes to divide the respon- 
sibility between three levels: government, HIAs col- 
lectively and HIAs individually. Each level would be 
held responsible for a certain share (e.g. 25SO-25%) 
of any deficits occurring at the global level. Each level 
would have to take appropriate action to recover 
deficits. Some instruments of budget control would 
remain the exclusive domain of the government such 
as planning of health care facilities, registration of 
drugs, etc. However, other areas would remain a 
collective responsibility of the HIAs such as tariff and 
fee agreements with providers. He also proposes that 
the means which are currently available to HIAs, 
such as the monitoring and control of providers with 
respect to the appropriateness of care delivered, 
should be complemented with managed care-type or 
selective contracts with providers. 
This rather complex subdivision of responsibility 
seems to be based on three assumptions, i.e.: 
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(1) that it is impossible to construct a ‘fair’ 
capitation formula to allocate the total 
revenues between the individual HIAs on the 
basis of the characteristics of their insured 
populations; 
(2) that HIAs collectively represent more 
bargaining power to negotiate fees with 
providers than each HIA individually; and 
(3) that the government should retain some 
crucial regulatory power and therefore also 
part of the financial responsibility. 
A serious drawback of the proposed system of 
shared financial responsibility appears to be the 
dramatic dilution of the powerful incentive arising 
from full and clear financial responsibility. Worse 
even, this system appears to run the risk of creating 
numerous free rider problems: every ‘level’ and in- 
deed even every HIA will benefit from the efforts on 
cost control of the other ‘responsables’. This feature 
may unintentionally reduce the incentive to try to 
balance revenues and outlays. Despite the substantial 
limitation of each HIA’s individual responsibility, the 
proposed system still requires the construction of a 
‘fair’ capitation formula to divide the last 25% of any 
deficit (or surplus!) over the various HIAs. 
4.3. Regulated competition 
To avoid the shortcomings of the two strategic 
options discussed above, we suggest a possible third 
alternative way forward for the Belgian health care 
financing, thereby reiterating some of our previously 
formulated i+as [16]. At first glance, it appears that 
reshaping the Belgian health care market to more 
closely resemble managed competition would require 
fewer changes than in countries like the U.K. and the 
Netherlands where such decisions have recently been 
taken. A sponsor-of the Enthoven [ 171 type defined 
as ‘an agency that assures eligible beneficiary finan- 
cial coverage of health care expenses at a reasonable 
price’has always been at the core of the postwar 
Belgian health care system. The Belgian National 
Health Insurance Instite (RIZIV) is the prime candi- 
date to become the ‘active, intelligent, collective agent 
on the demand side to structure and adjust the 
market in a continuing, but never completely success- 
ful, effort to overcome its tendencies to failure.’ 
Some crucial prerequisites for a true species of 
managed competition to come about have, however, 
always been lacking. We will briefly review the major 
characteristics of a system of managed competition 
and to what extent they would require adaptation of 
the current Belgian system. 
Financial accountability of insurers. Health care 
revenues currently already are collected centrally by 
means of taxes and social insurance premiums (pay- 
roll taxes) which ensure a fair degree of solidarity 
according to ability to pay. But for any type of 
regulated competition to be given a chance to work, 
the perverse financing mechanism of allocating rev- 
enues to HIAs on the basis of income-related premi- 
ums paid by HIA members would have to be 
radically changed into a, preferably health-adjusted, 
capitation formula. The HIAs should receive an 
annual payment from the Central Fund for each 
individual insured which reflects a percentage (e.g. 
85%) of the average medical care expenses. The 
(actuarial) categories representing the various health 
risks should not only depend on a few simple charac- 
teristics such as age and sex but ideally also include 
good proxies for health status. The remaining per- 
centage of the expenditures (e.g. 15%) needs to be 
covered from premiums directly paid by the insured. 
To avoid premium differentiations, these premiums 
have to be community rated, i.e. they are flat rate 
premiums which may differ between insurers but 
which are equal for all insured of the same insurer. 
Ironically, a very similar allocation mechanism has 
been proposed already in a law of 1949 but appar- 
ently has never been applied because of lack of 
consensus as to what risk factors ought to be included 
in the capitation formula [18]. One of the variables 
which is commonly quoted in the Dutch discussions 
as crucial is place of residence. More than in most 
other countries this regional aspect has an explosive 
character in Belgium. It is well known that there are 
large differences in medical consumption between the 
northern and the southern region. Several investi- 
gators have sought to identify which part of this 
variation can be explained by observable proxies for 
need differences and concluded that a large part 
remained unexplained. It is hypothesized that part of 
the unexplained variation is due to supply factors 
(e.g. differing practice styles). Although it seems in 
principle unfair that a capitation formula should 
account also for such supply differences by granting 
higher capitation payments to e.g. residents of high 
consumption areas, it is politically inconceivable that, 
at least in a first phase, such differences would not be 
taken into account in the payments. One possibility 
to overcome this problem would be to start off with 
a formula that accounts for regional differences but 
to gradually phase out the weight of the regional 
element over a number of years. 
As in any other system, the development of an 
adequate formula would be of great importance and 
not an easy task at all. However, given the recent 
findings that-apart from demographic variables- 
past use of the health care system is one of the best 
predictors of future expenditures (see e.g. [19,20]), 
the Belgian current situation in which data are rou- 
tinely collected on the use of all types of health care 
services paid fee-for-service has some advantages. 
These huge records data bases gathered by the HIAs 
could be used as a starting point to devise an initial 
capitation formula. 
If, on the basis of such a formula, competing HIAs 
would receive a closed budget with which to pay for 
the health care expenditures of their insured, it would 
no longer be unfair to force them to at least break- 
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even. They would become truly Accountable Health 
Plans in the Enthoven sense [21]. HIAs which are 
successful in improving the cost-effectiveness of 
health care delivery while maintaining high quality 
care should be rewarded by allowing them to reserve 
any operating surpluses or pass the profits on to their 
insured by offering lower premiums. Of course, they 
would then also have to be given more instruments 
than they currently have to control costs effectively 
and stimulate cost-effective behaviour by health care 
providers. 
Insurer-provider relationship. Undoubtedly, one 
of the most powerful means of introducing cost- 
effectiveness considerations into treatment decisions 
is to alter provider payment schemes. Currently, 
insurers are legally required to reimburse at centrally 
agreed fees all care that is provided by registered 
providers to their insured. If they were to be held 
financially accountable for their operations, they are 
also to be given the opportunity to pass on this 
incentive for efficiency to the providers of care. This 
could mean as little as small variations in fee sched- 
ules or monitoring to as much as radical departures 
from fee-for-service payments and even selective con- 
tracting with preferred providers. Given the current 
excess supply of physicians and the high density of 
most other health services in Belgium, the chances for 
success of selective contracting do not seem to be very 
low. It would mean the end of complete freedom of 
choice of doctor for those patients subscribing to 
such policies with reduced choice. Fierce opposition 
from the organized medical profession for such ideas 
can be expected. C._* course, the selectivity can take 
many forms, going from yes/no reimbursement o 
lower reimbursement percentages for non-preferred 
providers. The fact that some HIAs now already 
operate their own services (outpatient clinics, phar- 
macies, . . .) and have closer links with some hospitals 
than others could ease any developments towards 
preferred-provider arrangements. 
In addition, preferred-provider arrangements 
would open up possibilities for experiments with 
financial reward systems other than the currently 
prevailing fee-for-service system. Similar to the 
developments in the US health maintenance organiz- 
ations (HMOs), one would gradually expect the 
use of prepaid capitation payments or at least 
mixed capitation/fee-for-service payment schemes 
to rise quickly. The HMO idea does, of course, 
assume that any efficiency gains arising from the 
integration of the insurer and provider function can 
be passed on to consumers by means of premium 
reductions. 
Insurer-insured relationship. For managed compe- 
tition to work, the third party payers also have to be 
given an incentive, not only to contain costs but also 
to aim at the best price/quality ratio. In other words, 
insurers have to be rewarded not for providing just 
the lowest cost health insurance policies but rather 
for insuring the best possible cost/quality combi- 
nation. Insured must have the option to select the 
insurer of their choice. At present, this choice is 
limited in Belgium to one of the six HIAs. In order 
to make competition workable, it seems desirable to 
make this market contestable in the medium run to 
reduce the risk of collusive arrangements. It seems 
hard to defend why newcomers in the health in- 
surance market, e.g. private companies, should be 
denied entry provided they abide by the same set of 
rules of competition. 
As in most proposals for managed competition, 
such pro-competitive regulation would have to in- 
clude open enrolment, community rating, a basic 
package option and certain requirements regarding 
the provision of information about alternative health 
plans to avoid cream skimming by risk selection [22]. 
Compliance with all of these rules would make both 
the existing HIAs and the newcomers eligible for 
capitation payments from the Central Fund for their 
insured. As in any other proposal for managed 
competition, the question remains to what extent a 
fine-tuned capitation formula and pro-competitive 
legislation will suffice to prevent cream skimming 
[231. 
The importance of this need for contestability of 
the market in the Belgian context should not be 
underestimated: the current ideological and political 
alignment of the existing HIAs carries a great risk 
that competition for insured may take place through 
non-health related benefits (e.g. other social welfare 
services) rather than through just health insurance 
premiums. Despite the possibility of switching HIAs 
every three months, the mobility of insured has 
traditionally been fairly low. 
Many crucial features of such a competitive design 
call for further thought and discussion before im- 
plementation can be even considered. One important 
matter to be resolved is what types of health services 
will have to be included in the basic benefits package 
and which services will be left to complementary 
insurance. Up until now, the Belgian health insurance 
coverage has been fairly comprehensive. A legitimate 
question is whether all of the current entitlements of 
the National Health Insurance program would have 
to be included in a basic insurance package. A related 
question is what share of this basic entitlements 
package would have to be covered by the capitation 
payment and what share would have to be accounted 
for by the (flat, community-rated) premium to be 
charged by the HIAs to their insured. Is there a role 
for cost-sharing by deductibles and copayments and 
to what extent would it be allowed to re-insure these 
out-of-pocket payments? Can a managed health in- 
surance market coexist with national planning of 
health care facilities? 
Answers to these and other questions will have to 
come from political debate informed by research 
findings. As interest in regulated competition in 
health care is growing in countries other than the 
United States, also the research evidence on the 
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feasibility or workability of such designs is accumu- 
lating [24-261. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Eight years ago, at an international conference held 
in Antwerp in 1985 on Economic Incentives in Health 
Care with a substantially overlapping speaker’s pro- 
gramme as today’s conference, we already attempted 
to draw some conclusions for Belgium [16]. We 
concluded then that: 
Putting the general principle of reinforcing the agency role 
into practice in the Belgian health care setting would require 
a redefinition of the role of the sickness funds. (. . .) There 
seem to be two major ways in which the sickness fund’s role 
could be strengthened by putting them financially at risk. 
The regulatory approach would imply that they get fixed 
budgets from the national social security budget for which 
they would have to cover their beneficiaries for a prespe- 
cified set of risks. (. . .) 
The regulated-competition approach would require more 
profound changes in the system. [l6, p. 1131. 
Today it seems that much of the financing and cost 
containment problems are still the same but that, 
unlike in 1985, there is more debate about the 
incentive role to be played by designating financial 
accountability. Although recent government policies 
are no evidence of a belief in the importance of 
strengthening the role of third-party payers, we still 
think that enhancing their role in a pro-competitive 
environment will be crucial in any attempt o reshape 
the system to make it efficient and affordable while 
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can choose from a range of private for-profit 
companies, most of them operating as HMOs (medical 
care at a prepaid fee). This market is a highly competi- 
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